א כיצד אדם עושה דין לעצמו. ובו סעיף אחד: יכול אדם לעשות דין לעצמו אם רואה שלו ביד אחר שגזלו יכול לקחתו מידו ואם האחר עומד כנגדו יכול להכותו עד שיניחנו (אם לא יכול להציל בענין אחר) (טור) אפי' הוא דבר שאין בו הפסד אם ימתין עד שיעמידנו בדין והוא שיכול לברר ששלו הוא נוטל בדין מ"מ אין לו רשות למשכנו בחובו: הגה מטעם שיתבאר לקמן סי' צ"ז סעיף ו' וי"א דוקא בחובו ממש אבל אם חייב לו בלא הלואה או שא"צ למשכנו כי הוא כבר אצלו בפקדון או מצאו ביד אחר מותר לתפסו (ריב"ש סי' שצ"ו) וי"א דלא אמרינן עביד אינש דינא לנפשיה רק בחפץ המבורר לו שהוא שלו כגון שגזלו או רוצה לגזלו או רוצה להזיקו יכול להציל שלו אבל אם כבר נתחייב לו מכח גזילה או ממקום אחר לא (מרדכי ונ"י פ' המניח) ודוקא הוא בעצמו יכול למעבד דינא לנפשיה אבל אסור לעשות ע"י העכו"ם (ת"ה סי' ש"ד) ומיהו אם עבר ועשה ע"י השרים אם לא היה יכול להציל שלא בענין אחר מה שעשה עשוי (ע' במהרי"ק שורש קס"א) י"א דלא מיקרי עביד דינא לנפשיה אלא כשמזיק לחבירו כגון שמכהו ולכן לא יוכל לעשות אלא א"כ יוכל לברר שהוא שלו אבל תפיסה בעלמא שתפסו למשכון יכול לעשות בכל ענין ויורד אח"כ עמו לדין (מהרי"ק שורש סי' קס"א) וכל זה מיירי ביחיד נגד יחיד אבל יחיד נגד רבים והוא מבני העיר עבדי דינא לנפשייהו אם יודעים שהדין עמהם אע"פ שאין יכולים לברר לפני ב"ד כי אינם יכולים להעיד שכולן נוגעין בדבר (תשו' הרשב"א כ"ז סי' צ"ה) ע' בסי' ז' סעיף י"ב וסי' ל"ז ואם יש חלוקים וטענות ביניהם הקהל נקראים מוחזקים לגבי היחיד וצריך לתת להם משכון קודם שירדו עמו לדין (מרדכי פ' המוכר פירות וס"פ לא יחפור) והא דנקראים מוחזקים לגבי יחיד דוקא בענייני מסים אבל לא בשאר דברים ומ"מ צריך לתת משכון קודם שירדו לדין עמו (ת"ה סי' שמ"א) וכל זה כשאין היחיד ת"ח אבל אם הוא ת"ח שתורתו אומנתו ויש לו דין בזה מחמת מסים א"צ לתת להם משכון וגם אינם נקראים מוחזקים נגדו (מוהר"ם מירזבורג) ומותר לכוף בענייני מסים ע"י עכו"ם ולהפסידו אם אינם יכולים להוציא ממנו המס בענין אחר (מהרי"ק שורש י"ז וכ"ז):
1 A person may take the law into his own hands in order to safeguard his interests. If he sees aught that belongs to him in the hand of another person who robbed it [from him], he may take it from his hand, and if the latter makes a stand against him, he may strike him until he releases it, — if he cannot save [ the stolen article ] otherwise — even if it is aught that does not involve an irretrievable loss should he [have to] wait until he takes legal proceedings against him, provided he can prove that [what] he takes [is] his own in accordance with the law. Nevertheless, he has no right to seize a pledge for his debt [when it matures]. Rema: On account of the reason which will be explained infra § 97, par. 6. Some say [ that this applies ] only to [ seizing a pledge ] for his actual debt [ which was incurred through a loan ], but if he owes him [ aught ] not on account of a loan, or where he [ the creditor ] does not have to take a pledge, — for it [ the pledge ] is already in his possession as a deposit — or [ in the case where ] he discovered it in the possession of another person — he is permitted to seize it. And some say that we apply the principle 'A man may take the law into his own hands in order to safeguard his interests' only with respect to an article [ concerning which ] it is clearly evident to him that it is his, e.g., where one robbed him, or one desires to rob him, or one desires to cause him damage, [ in which case ] he may save that which belongs to him, but if one has become liable to him on account of a [ previous ] robbery or on account of other grounds, [ we do ] not [ apply this principle ]. And only he alone may take the law into his own hands in order to safeguard his interests, but he is forbidden to do [ this ] through a heathen Court. However, if he violated [ the law ] and did [ this ] by means of the [ government ] officers, — provided he was not able to save [ aught ] in another manner, — [ the law is that ] his act cannot be undone. Some say that [ the principle ] 'a man may take the law into his own hands in order to safeguard his interests' is applicable only when he inflicts injury upon his fellow, e.g., when he strikes him. Consequently, one may [ so ] act only when he can make certain that the [ article in question ] is his own, but a mere seizure, [ viz., in the case ] where he seized a pledge [ without having to resort to force — the law is that ] one may do [ this ] in any case and subsequently he goes down with him to Court. This entire [ foregoing ruling ] deals with one individual in conflict with [ another ] individual, but [ in the case of ] an individual in conflict with an [ entire ] community, — [ the law is that if ] he is one of the townsmen, they may take the law into their own hands in order to safeguard their interests, [ provided ] if they know that the law is in their favour, although they are unable to prove [ this ] before the Court of Law, — for they cannot testify since they are all interested parties in the matter., § 7, par. 12 and § 37. And if there are differences of opinion and claims between them, — the [ members of the ] community are called the actual possessors with respect to the individual [ who is in conflict with them ], and he is required to give them a pledge before they go down with him to Court. The fact that they are called actual possessors with respect to an individual applies only in matters of taxes but not in other cases. Nevertheless, he must give [ them ] a pledge before they go down to Court with him. This entire [ foregoing ruling applies only ] where the individual [ who is in conflict with the community ] is not a scholar, but if he is a scholar where the [ study of the ] Torah is his [ sole ] profession and he has a claim in this [ matter ] on account of taxes, he is not required to give them a pledge and they too are not called actual possessors with respect to him. It is permissible to compel [ an individual to comply ] with [ the laws pertaining to ] matters of taxes by means of a heathen Court and to cause him to suffer a loss if they cannot collect from him the tax otherwise.