Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat Siman 15

Siman 15

Presented here for study, not as a practical ruling. The Shulchan Aruch rules by Sephardi custom, the Rema's glosses by Ashkenazi custom, and the Kitzur follows Ashkenazi custom. For a practical question, ask your rabbi.

א איזה דין דנין תחלה ודין דין מרומה. ובו ה סעיפים: צריך הדיין שיקדים לדון הדין שבא לפניו תחלה אבל צריך להקדים דין של תלמיד חכם אפילו בא לבסוף וכן מצוה עליו להפך בזכותו מה שיכול: הגה ואם הת"ח בעצמו לפני הדיינים אפי' פתחו כבר בדין אחר דנין אותו תחלה שלא יתבטל מלמודו אבל אם קרובו בא לדין אם פתחו בדין אחר אינו צריך לפסוק ואם לאו צריכין לדון אותו תחילה משום כבוד החכם (ב"י בשם הריטב"א):
1 The Judge is required to give priority to the adjudication of a lawsuit that comes before him first [in order]; but he must give priority to a lawsuit of a scholar even if it comes last [in order]. So too, is he [the Judge] religiously dutibound to seek whatever [points] he can [find] in his [the scholar's] favour. Rema: And if the scholar himself [ appears ] before the Judges, [ then ] even [ if ] they had already begun [ to adjudicate ] another lawsuit, they should judge him [ the scholar ] first, so that he should not be disturbed from his studies. However, if his [ the scholar's ] relative appeared for trial, [ then ] if they had [ already ] begun [ to adjudicate ] another lawsuit, there is no need to interrupt [ the adjudication ]; but if they had not [ begun ], they [ the Judges ] must judge him [ the relative ] first on account of showing respect for the scholar.
ב היו לפניו דינים הרבה מקדימין דין היתום לדין האלמנה ודין האלמנה קודם לדין ת"ח ודין ת"ח קודם לדין עם הארץ ודין האשה קודם לדין האיש:
2 [If] before him [the Judge] there were many lawsuits [awaiting a legal decision], we give priority to the orphan's lawsuit over the lawsuit of the widow, and the lawsuit of the widow takes precedence over the lawsuit of a Scholar, and the lawsuit of a Scholar takes precedence over the lawsuit of an illiterate person, and the lawsuit of a woman takes priority over the lawsuit of a man.
ג הדיין שבא לפניו דין שיודע שהוא מרומה לא יאמר אחתכנו ויהיה הקולר (פי' שלשלת העון) תלוי בצואר העדים כיצד יעשה ידרוש בו ויחקור הרבה בדרישה וחקירה של דיני נפשות: הגה ומ"מ אין דינו כדיני נפשות שאם אמר בא' מן החקירות אינו יודע שיתבטל העדות אלא ר"ל שיחקור בדין מרומה כל מה שאפשר (ריב"ש סי' רס"ו) אם נראה לו לפי דעתו שיש בו רמאות או שאין דעתו סומכת על דברי העדים אע"פ שאינו יכול לפסלן או שדעתו נוטה שבע"ד זה רמאי ובעל ערמה והשיא את העדים אע"פ שהם כשרים ולפי תומם העידו וזה הטעם או שנראה לו מכלל הדברים שיש שם דברים אחרים מסותרים ואינם רוצים לגלותם כל אלו הדברי' וכיוצא בהם אסור לו לחתוך אותו הדין אלא יסלק עצמו מדין זה וידוננו מי שלבו שלם בדבר והרי הדברים מסורים ללב וכשהיה רואה הרא"ש באומדנא דמוכח שהדין מרומה הי' כותב ונותן ביד הנתבע שאין לשום דיין להשתדל בדין זה:
3 The Judge before whom a lawsuit comes [up] which he knows to be fraudulent, should not say, 'I will decide it [in accordance with the testimony of the witnesses] and the collar [of responsibility], i.e., the chain of guilt, will hang around the neck of the witnesses.' In what manner should he act? — He should investigate and inquire into the matter closely by means of [the methods employed in the] cross-examination and investigation of capital cases. Rema: Nevertheless, the law [ of cross-examination in this case ] is not [ as strict ] as [ in ] capital cases where if [ a witness ] stated during one of the inquiries, 'I know not,' that the testimony becomes void; but what is meant to be said is that he [ the Judge ] should inquire into a fraudulent lawsuit as much as it is possible. If it appears to him [the Judge] according to his understanding that there is fraud therein, or where his common sense [directs him] not to rely upon the statements of the witnesses although he cannot [find grounds] to disqualify them, or where his [practical] judgment inclines [to assume] that this litigant is a deceiver and a cunning person and mislead the witnesses although they are eligible [witnesses] and gave evidence in ignorance of its legal bearing, and this party [the deceiving litigant] led them astray, or it appears to him [the Judge] from the general contents of the statements that there are other concealed matters therein and they are not willing to reveal them, — [then the law is that in] all these [aforementioned] matters and anything similar to these, he is forbidden to render a legal decision in that lawsuit, but he should withdraw from this case and one whose heart [intelligence] is perfect in [the examination of] such a case should judge it and these are matters entrusted to the heart [intelligence]. When Asheri would notice on the basis of a well-grounded assumption that the lawsuit is fraudulent, he would prepare a document and place [it] in the possession of the defendant [to the effect] that no Judge should make an effort to try this lawsuit.
ד במד"א שהתובע רמאי אבל כשהנתבע רמאי אין הדיין יכול להסתלק שלא ישתכר הרמאי ברמאותו אלא ידרוש ויחקור יפה לבטל רמאותו ואם נראה לו באומדנא דמוכח שהוא חייב יחייבנו אם הוא דיין מומחה ויחיד בדורו: הגה ובדרך זה יוכל הדיין לומר להנתבע ג"כ שלא יתן לו זמן עד שיעמיד ערבות כי אין לדיין באלו הדברים רק מה שעיניו רואות (מהרי"ק שורש י"ד) ויכול אפילו להשביע במקום שאינו חייב שבועה מצד הדין אם עושה כדי לברר האמת (שם שורש קפ"ז):
4 When does this apply? — Where the claimant is a deceiver. However, when the defendant is a deceiver, the Judge cannot withdraw [from the case] so that the deceiver should not be at an advantage, but he [the Judge] should examine and investigate [the defendant] closely in order to upset his deception. And if it becomes apparent to him [the Judge] on the basis of a well-grounded assumption that he [the defendant] is guilty, he may declare him guilty [provided] if he is a recognized Judge and distinguished in his generation. Rema: In this manner the Judge can likewise say to the defendant that he will not grant him [ an extension ] of time [ in order to produce witnesses ] until he deposits security, — for in such matters the Judge takes into consideration only whatever seems to him [ to be correct ], and he [ the Judge ] can impose an oath even where he [ the defendant ] is legally not bound to take an oath, — [ provided ] if he does [ this ] in order to ascertain the truth.
ה יש לדיין לדון דיני ממונות ע"פ הדברים שדעתו נוטה להם שהם אמת והדבר חזק בלבו שהוא כך אע"פ שאין שם ראיה ברורה ומשרבו בתי דינים שאינם הגונים ובעלי בינה הסכימו שלא יהפכו שבועה אלא בראיה ברורה ולא יפגמו שטר ויפסידו חזקתו על פי עדות אשה או קרוב אע"פ שדעתו סומכת על דבריהם וכן אין מוציאים מהיתומים אלא בראיה ברורה לא בדעת הדיין ולא באומדן המת או הטוען ואעפ"כ אם העיד אדם נאמן בדבר מכל הדברים ונטתה דעת הדיין שאמת הוא אומר ממתין בדין ואינו דוחה עדותו ונושא ונותן עם בעלי דינים עד שיודו לדברי העד ודורש וחוקר עד שיתברר הדבר או יעשו פשרה או יסתלק מן הדין כמו שנתבאר: הגה ואם נראה לב"ד שאחד גוזל חבירו ולא יוכלו להוציאו ממנו בדין יכולין לגזור על שאר בני אדם שלא ישאו ויתנו עמו ואם היא אשה שלא תנשא לאיש ולא יעסקו בשידוכיה עד שתוציא מידה שאינה שלה (פסקי מהרא"י סי' ר"ס) וע"ל סי' שנ"ח סעיף ה':
5 A Judge should try monetary cases in accordance with those facts to which his [practical] judgment inclines [to assume] that they are true and [provided that] the matter becomes firmly established in his heart [mind] that it is actually so, although no clear evidence is available thereon. However, from the time that Courts of Law [whose members] are not virtuous, — [and were they even virtuous in their deeds, are not sufficiently learned], nor possess understanding, — became numerous, they agreed not to transfer an oath [to an opponent] save on [the basis of] clear evidence, nor to impair a bond and [thereby] cause damage to its legal status on the testimony of a woman or a relative, although his [practical] judgment [is inclined to] rely on their statements. Thus too, we do not make orphans surrender [aught nowadays] save on [the basis of] clear evidence, nor [do we make them surrender aught] on [the basis of] the knowledge of the Judge, nor [on grounds of] the financial position of the deceased or the claimant. Nevertheless, if a reliable person offered testimony in any one of the [aforementioned] matters and the [practical] judgment of the Judge inclined [to assume] that [whatever] he [the witness] is stating [is] the truth, — [the law is that] he [the Judge] should be patient in giving his decision and should not dismiss his testimony but should discuss [the matter] with the litigants until they confess to the statements of the witness and he [the Judge] should examine and inquire [into the case] until [the veracity of] the matter is established, or [until] they [the litigants] make a settlement by arbitration, or [until] the Judge withdraws from the lawsuit as has been explained [supra]. Rema: If it becomes apparent to the Court of Law that one [ of the litigants ] robbed his fellow, but legally they cannot compel him to surrender it [ the object acquired illegitimately ], — [ the law is that ] they can issue a decree against other people not to have any dealings with him, and if it is a woman, — that she be not married to any man nor should they conduct negotiations preliminary to her betrothal until she surrenders that which does not belong to her.
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